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However well-established the phenomenon of brain plasticity 
may be, the question whether we should conceive of mind–brain 
relations as 1:1 or 1:X remains unanswered. We believe this lack of 
success is mainly due to the lack of a proper conceptual and meth-
odological framework to approach the issue: It seems difficult to 
decide whether two occurrences of a mental state or a brain state 
are identical or not. This decision must, however, be made in order 
to answer the over-all question about the relationship between the 
two kinds of states.
This paper aims to take the first steps toward such a framework, 
outlining an approach to analyze the problem, and giving examples 
of the issues being considered.
Background
There is a constantly growing number of studies demonstrating 
that when a particular sensory input is lacking (due to periph-
eral loss – but without injury to the brain) a series of short- and 
long-term reorganizations take place within various levels of the 
brain systems representing the affected modality. Such reorganiza-
tions occur, for instance, within the somatotopic representations 
IntroductIon
One of the primary concerns in the attempt to isolate some neural 
correlate of consciousness (NCC) is the question whether con-
scious content relates to brain processes in a fixed 1:1 pattern, or 
whether the same content may be realized in different brain proc-
esses. The answer to this question will have important theoretical 
consequences: Should the latter view be correct, it would seem 
futile to reduce or identify conscious content with one specific 
brain process. Instead, such a finding would support theories that 
allow a “one-to-many” relationship.
The experimental literature is already rich with examples show-
ing that individual connections in the brain are constantly being 
modified, largely dependent upon how they are used (e.g., Keller-
Peck et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2006, 2008). Decades ago, it was shown 
that if the cortical organization for a sensory system is deprived of 
input, it will become activated at a later time in response to other, 
usually adjacent inputs (e.g., Yang et al., 1994; Weiss et al., 2000; Karl 
et al., 2001). Such reorganization seems to be found with any chosen 
method of analysis, be it changes in individual cells,  networks of 
cells, or entire “modules.”
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of  various body-parts (e.g., Yang et al., 1994; Weiss et al., 2000; 
Karl et al., 2001) and the tonotopic representations of the auditory 
system (e.g., Robertson and Irvine, 1989; Scheich, 1991; Irvine, 
2007; Thai-Van et al., 2007).
Individuals, who lost one hand to amputation (thereby depriv-
ing the somatosensory cortex of the contralateral hemisphere of 
normal input to the region specialized for processing hand-related 
information), have been studied extensively (e.g., Yang et al., 1994; 
Weiss et al., 2000; Karl et al., 2001). In such persons, the region of 
the primary somatosensory cortex, which used to represent the now 
amputated hand, does not remain inactive. Instead, the neighbor-
ing somatosensory regions (representing the arm and face, respec-
tively) encroach on the now “vacant” area in such a way that the 
“input-lacking” cortical hand area is eventually fully taken over by 
inputs from arm and face, respectively. Plastic reorganizations of 
the somatosensory cortical map do, however, not only occur under 
conditions of a lacking input from parts of the body. Even changed 
experiences in terms of intensive training restricted to part of the 
body may be associated with a relative shift within somatosensory 
representations (e.g., Merzenich and Jenkins, 1993; Elbert et al., 
1995; Xerri et al., 1996; Münte et al., 2002).
Showing that these plastic processes within the somatosensory 
system are not unique, the tonotopic representations of the auditory 
system appear also to undergo plastic changes due to changes in 
input or experience. Partial loss of input (e.g., due to restricted coch-
lear lesions) deprives the tonotopic representation of input within a 
restricted spectrum of frequencies. Upon such a manipulation, the 
representations of the neighboring frequencies expand to fill the 
“vacant” region of for instance the auditory cortex (e.g., Robertson 
and Irvine, 1989; Scheich, 1991; Irvine, 2007; Thai-Van et al., 2007). 
Within the frequencies, which have – due to such mechanisms – 
gained an increased neural representation, the quality of frequency 
discrimination appear to be enhanced (Thai-Van et al., 2007). 
Learning experiences specific to a restricted tonal representation 
are also able to induce an increased representation of the frequen-
cies in question (e.g., Scheich, 1991; Recanzone et al., 1993; Irvine, 
2007) – and this increased representation within the tonotopic rep-
resentation seems to be correlated with the quality of performance 
of the auditory discrimination task (e.g., Recanzone et al., 1993).
While the above examples deal with plastic reorganizations 
within one modality, there are also examples demonstrating the 
even more radical phenomenon of cross-modal plasticity. For 
instance, such a phenomenon has been found in the context of 
attempts to provide the blind with a “visual prosthesis.” The idea 
of such research is to provide a – presently crude but nevertheless 
potentially useful – representation of the visual world via a somato-
sensory input. Captured by a camera, the image of the environment 
is transformed into a crude – “low-resolution” – representation 
in the form of a matrix with “active” and “inactive” pixels. This 
matrix is presented to the blind subject in the form of somato-
sensory stimulation. The matrix is brought into contact with a 
part of the body surface and “active” pixels are designated by for 
instance vibration or mild electric stimulation (while “inactive” 
pixels lack such a stimulation). In a number of these experiments 
the inputs have been simple geometric patterns – for instance let-
ters of various orientations (e.g., Bach-y-Rita et al., 1969, 1998; 
Kaczmarek et al., 1991; Ptito et al., 2005). It has been demonstrated 
by Ptito et al. (2005) that both blind and normally sighted (but 
blindfolded) individuals can learn to utilize this device in solv-
ing discrimination tasks in which they are required to determine 
the orientation of letters. While the ability to acquire the task was 
similar in both groups, the neural regions activated during task 
performance turned out to differ. In both groups somatosensory 
cortical regions were activated but in the blind group (in contrast 
to the sighted individuals) additional activations were found in 
cortical regions normally associated with the processing of visual 
information (Ptito et al., 2005). In contrast, the sighted but blind-
folded subjects demonstrated a cortical activation pattern similar 
to what would be expected when performing an ordinary tactile 
discrimination task (Ptito et al., 2005). It may be especially relevant 
that in the blind subjects, successful task solution was associated 
with activation of cortical regions, which in sighted individuals 
participates in mediation of visual tasks in which the spatial orien-
tation of figures is to be determined. It should be noted that Ptito 
et al. (2005) studied individuals who were “early blind.”
The most commonly studied aspect of cross-modal plasticity 
in the blind is the involvement of visual cortical areas in the per-
formance of Braille reading (e.g., Gizewski et al., 2003; Ptito et al., 
2008). There have been some doubts regarding the specificity of the 
involvement of visual areas in tactile discrimination tasks related to 
Braille reading (Gizewski et al., 2003). However, in a study directly 
addressing this issue, Gizewski et al. (2003) found that in early blind 
subjects somatosensory activation of visual areas was exclusively 
related to the performance of tactile discrimination tasks (includ-
ing Braille reading) – but not elicited by electrical stimulation of 
the hand used in the performance these tasks.
The main focus of studies such as those described above is the 
ability of the brain to reorganize in ways that allow a structure or 
substructure to become functionally engaged within a domain, 
which is more or less dissimilar to the type of information process-
ing, originally managed by the circuitry in question. Regarding shifts 
of somatotopic or tonotopic maps, the plasticity-induced novelty 
concerns different aspects within the same sensory modality, while 
– in cross-modal plasticity – other cases even demonstrate a shift to 
processing sensory information of another modality than the one 
to which the brain region is supposedly originally “programmed.”
Normally, such results are taken to indicate that a given brain 
structure is able to subserve multiple “functions” – at least within 
the restrictions indicated by various studies (cross-modal changes 
may, for instance, most easily or maybe exclusively be achieved in 
case of early deprivation of a sensory modality, e.g., Ptito et al., 2005).
When seen from another angle, the above-described examples 
can also be seen as indications that the same “function” can be 
mediated by multiple neural substrates. This may not commonly 
be the focus of such studies, but when, for instance, an area previ-
ously specialized in processing information regarding a hand is able 
also to mediate face-related information processing, this may also 
be framed in terms of a “relocation” of face-related information 
processing. More clear-cut cases of an apparent “relocation” of func-
tional mediation are, however, to be found within the literature deal-
ing with the neural substrate of post-traumatic functional recovery.
It must, however, be remembered that theoretically an  apparent 
“relocalization” of functional mediation (as a consequence of either 
a modified input to an intact brain or regional brain injury) might 
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different type of post-traumatic reorganization (e.g., Duffau et al., 
2002). Numerous methods have been employed in demonstrating 
the post-recovery substrate of language processing in patients suf-
fering aphasia – some of the most common methods being imaging 
techniques (e.g., Perani et al., 2003) and physiological methods such 
as event-related potentials (e.g., Laganaro et al., 2008).
Aphasias primarily result from injury to the left hemisphere 
and the contribution of ipsilateral (left hemisphere) mediation of 
the reacquired linguistic functions have been demonstrated by for 
instance Szaflarski et al. (2010), Perani et al. (2003), Specht et al. 
(2009), and Meinzer et al. (2008) – the latter study demonstrat-
ing treatment-induced reintegration of various perilesional areas. 
The most common question asked within this field is, however, 
whether the contralateral, right, hemisphere plays a significant 
role in mediating post-traumatic recovery of language. The earli-
est case in which it was presumed that post-traumatic recovery 
upon expressive aphasia (also known as non-fluent aphasia – a 
condition characterized by difficulty producing speech on the 
background of a relatively preserved comprehension of language) 
was mediated by mechanisms within the right hemisphere (in 
this case the mirror-structure of Broca’s area), was published by 
Barlow (1877). Doubts about this case remain, and Finger et al. 
(2003) concluded that we still know too little to fully interpret 
cases such as this one. However, without going into the details of 
whether a case like Barlow’s manifest a true case of “vicariation” 
(the phenomenon that brain areas with different functions can 
sometimes assume or “take over” the function of an injured brain 
region – e.g., Finger and Stein, 1982; Slavin et al., 1988) it is clear 
that numerous studies – utilizing a variety of methods – have found 
an apparent involvement of structures within the right hemisphere 
in mediation of post-traumatic recovery in aphasia (e.g., Thomas 
et al., 1997; Thulborn et al., 1999; Ansaldo et al., 2002; Ansaldo 
and Arguin, 2003; Perani et al., 2003; Baumgaertner et al., 2005; 
Specht et al., 2009). In some cases (e.g., Thomas et al., 1997) there 
are indications that the patterns of shift toward a right hemisphere 
mediation of linguistic functions differ between types of aphasia. 
Furthermore, changes in the direction of language being mediated 
by the right hemisphere are often accompanied by internal reor-
ganizations within the left hemisphere (where linguistic mediation 
may shift to uninjured regions). These reorganizations may lead to 
a more bilateral representation of language – due to the concurrent 
shift of linguistic mediation within the injured left hemisphere 
and to the contralateral, right hemisphere (e.g., Thompson et al., 
2010). In most instances, the recovery-associated shifts toward right 
hemisphere mediation of language occur without the rehabilitative 
training specifically aiming at such a shift (but rather working in 
a more general way toward a recovery of the lost linguistic abili-
ties). There are, however, cases in which (partly successful) train-
ing of aphasic patients have aimed at achieving a higher degree 
of right hemisphere mediation of linguistic tasks (e.g., Crosson 
et al., 2009 – who used a manipulation task performed with the 
patient’s left hand to initiate naming trials and thereby obtain an 
independent right hemisphere activation which presumably can 
ease an interhemispheric shift of linguistic task mediation). It can 
often correctly be questioned to what extend the changes in neural 
activity observed via for instance fMRI in a recovering or recovered 
aphasic patient are specifically related to the reacquisition of the 
be accompanied by a “rewiring” of the local circuitry within the 
novel substrate of functional mediation. If the neural plasticity 
mediating the “relocalization” not only changes the input/output 
properties of the novel structure mediating a function, but also 
rewires the internal networks of this brain region, it could be argued 
that the entire process includes the creation of an actual copy of the 
neural network mediating the function within its original location. 
If this can be the case, a 1:1 relationship between function and 
neural processing could be preserved while the site of the mediating 
circuitry has just shifted to a novel structure.
Thus, it is important to consider how likely it is to find a (re)
establishment of the basic circuitry of brain regions in the adult 
brain. This issue is pursued in more detail by Mogensen (2011a,c). 
During maturation, neurons undergo a number of changes mak-
ing them less similar to the developing neurons, which originally 
formed the local circuits of the brain (e.g., Fawcett et al., 1989; 
Chen et al., 1995; Goldberg et al., 2002). These restrictions may, 
however, be somewhat outweighed by the ongoing neurogenesis in 
the adult brain – a neurogenesis which is further potentiated when 
the brain is hit by injury (e.g., Magavi et al., 2000; Scharff et al., 2000; 
Arvidsson et al., 2002; Nakatomi et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2004). 
These newly formed neurons may in the injured brain even receive 
some support in reaching relevant brain regions – upon injury, 
mature astrocytes are able to transform themselves into radial glial 
cells similar to those guiding neural migration (and thereby the 
arrival of newly formed neurons in the relevant brain structures) 
during development (e.g., Rakic, 1971, 1985; Leavitt et al., 1999). 
There may, however, be at least one crucial factor preventing the – 
uninjured or injured – adult brain from recreation of networks 
similar to those formed during development: from the final stages 
of the original ontogenic development (and thereby formation of 
the basic circuitry of the brain) a number of factors associated with 
glial cells and myelin (e.g., Berry, 1982; Schwab and Thoenen, 1985; 
Schäfer et al., 2008) appear to prevent restructuring and presum-
ably recreation of such basic circuitry. Especially important may be 
the astrocyte-produced chondroitin sulfate proteoglycans (CSPGs). 
These substances play an important role in the termination of the 
developmentally “critical periods” and thereby “consolidate” the 
originally formed circuitry in its “final” form (e.g., Pizzorusso et al., 
2002; Berardi et al., 2004; McGee et al., 2005; Del Rio and Soriano, 
2007; Schäfer et al., 2008). And the presence of these CSPGs appar-
ently blocks an adult recreation of traumatically lost networks (e.g., 
Del Rio and Soriano, 2007; Schäfer et al., 2008).
Maybe one of the cognitive domains, which have been most 
extensively studied with respect to the mechanisms of post- 
traumatic functional recovery, is language. Numerous studies have 
scrutinized (so far without reaching consensus) the neural substrate 
of post-traumatic functional recovery of patients suffering various 
types of aphasia due to either stroke or traumatic brain injury (TBI).
Most patients suffering post-traumatic aphasia regain at least 
a partial proficiency of language, and such a recovery process is 
accompanied by reorganizational processes within various parts 
of the brain (e.g., Marsh and Hillis, 2006). These reorganizational 
processes may be affected by the type of traumatic impact, itself. 
For instance, gliomas may be removed in either a one- or two-step 
surgical procedure. And compared to the more massive impact of 
the single surgical intervention, the two-step procedure leads to a 
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watches: Two analog ones and one digital. The two analog watches 
differ in timekeeping properties in that one runs fast and the other 
late. Nevertheless, the difference can be explained by one respect – a 
spring in one of the watches is longer than in the other. Shapiro 
argues that timekeeping is realized in the same way in these two 
watches although they have slightly different timekeeping proper-
ties. Timekeeping, nevertheless, is realized differently in the digital 
watch, he claims. If one of the analog watches had the exact identical 
timekeeping properties as the digital one, despite the difference in 
physical properties, it would be evidence for multiple realization. 
So, the example challenges evidence for multiple realization in the 
brain: Are the physical differences, relevant to realization, only 
relevant for that realized property? If so, it is not a case of “true 
multiple realization.”
Bechtel and Mundale (1999) argue that one central issue is that 
psychological as well as neural properties can be described with 
different “granularities.” They argue that psychological properties 
often are described at a very “coarse” level of granularity when 
deciding whether two mental states are identical or not, whereas 
neural properties are described at a much “finer” level. In order to 
make a comparison between two mental states, and thus conclude 
anything about whether some observation is a case of multiple 
realization, it must first be resolved at which level, mental states are 
properly described. In Table 1 we provide a tentative framework 
for levels of analysis relevant to this issue.
LeveLs of anaLysIs In cognItIve processes
To begin with, mental states may be compared at different levels. 
While the term “mental states” in itself is difficult to delineate and 
define, the first part of the paper will look at mental states as dis-
cussed in cognitive science: Functions which may be described as 
states or processes inferred from behavior.
Looking at cognitive states, we will tentatively suggest at least 
such three levels of analysis where a mental state may be defined 
and compared to other states.
At the most general level, it is a relatively simple task to determine 
whether or not an entire domain is intact, lost or fully recovered. 
Here, the question is simply if there is visual perception, language 
comprehension, or any such over-all function present. A person 
may loose her ability to understand language following an injury 
to the brain, but recover this ability. The ability may be only par-
tially recovered, understanding just some words, but at this general 
level it is the same function as before. At this level, the presence or 
language. A post-traumatic change in activity within a given struc-
ture may be the consequence of any trauma-related process – e.g., 
“disinhibition” due to lack of input from the injured brain region. 
Or other processes which are not directly related to the recovery 
of language. Certain cases are, however, highly informative in this 
respect. Meinzer et al. (2007), for instance, studied the linguistic 
recovery of a bilingual aphasic patient. In this case activation of 
parts of the superior temporal lobe of the right hemisphere was 
exclusively associated with use of the trained language while no such 
activation was observed associated with the untrained language.
To summarize, post-traumatic functional recovery upon brain 
injury – such as in the instances described above – may demonstrate 
that performance of the recovered task is associated with activity 
within brain regions, which were not pretraumatically involved in 
mediation of such tasks. Such results are normally taken to indicate 
that in one way or another a task mediation originally achieved 
by the injured part of the brain is now accomplished by neural 
mechanisms not previously involved in these functional domains.
In philosophy of mind, Block and Fodor (1972) used plastic 
properties of the brain as evidence for multiple realization and as 
an argument for functionalism. However, all findings mentioned 
above would be fully consistent with the proposal that whereas the 
post-traumatic, recovered function, e.g., the ability to speak, has 
superficial similarities with the pretraumatic function, the exact 
language structure has changed according to the change in neural 
substrate. What appear to be similar surface manifestations of a 
cognitive process may – when further scrutinized – turn out to 
be more dissimilar than originally assumed. For instance, a post-
traumatically recovered task performance may have allowed the 
injured individual to regain a full proficiency (to the level of what is 
achieved with an uninjured brain) but this recovery is nevertheless 
achieved via cognitive mechanisms which upon further scrutiny 
turns out to be dissimilar to those of normal individuals (e.g., 
Mogensen et al., 2004). The need for a more thorough analysis 
of the surface phenomena observed during functional recovery 
after brain injury has been both methodologically and theoretically 
discussed elsewhere (e.g., Mogensen and Malá, 2009; Mogensen, 
2011a,b,c; Wilms and Mogensen, in press).
At the same time, however, and as illustrated in the example of 
aphasia, it seems one may be able to argue for and against multiple 
realization, embracing the view that while the ability to speak, as 
such, is re-established in a different way in the brain, the exact same 
way of speaking, when analyzed in all details, is forever lost. That 
is: while viewed superficially the task performance of the patient 
demonstrates that general linguistic abilities are reacquired, but a 
more detailed analysis of the post-traumatic cognitive processes 
reveals that the post-traumatically established linguistic processes 
are dissimilar to those seen pretraumatically. This, in and of itself, 
reveals, at least, two unanswered questions underlying the debate: 
In which sense can two instances of a mental phenomenon be said 
to be the same, and with which methods could such an identity 
be established?
Although such questions appear directly from an analysis of 
empirical research, they have been debated for decades in philoso-
phy of mind. Notably, Shapiro (2004, 2008) discusses difficulties in 
considering multiple realization an immediately testable empiri-
cal hypothesis. Shapiro (2008) asks the reader to consider three 
Table 1 | Levels of analysis in the relation between cognitive and neural 
events. The number of levels and their labeling are tentative yet serve to 
show the approach.
Level of analysis Description
Cognitive domain General, functional manifestation level,  
 e.g., “visual perception”  
 or “language comprehension”
Task- and More specific function related to a domain,  
domain-specific function e.g., “visual form discrimination”
Basic functions Basic-level operations, may be 
 described in mathematical terms
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In the analysis of the neural substrate of post-traumatic recovery, 
it is more often than not impossible to tell at which “level” a neural 
substrate of postrehabilitation task mediation is a “replacement” 
of what has been lost. In other words: it is, for instance, unclear 
to what extent the same information processing (“function”) is 
present in the right hemisphere when recovering aphasic patients 
show an increased focal activation within that hemisphere. This 
situation is often a result of the understandable focus on clinical 
applications and the potentials of a therapeutic method with respect 
to achieving a successful rehabilitative process. It can be argued 
that the essential information is that: (1) the patient is clinically 
improving, and (2) activation and/or establishment of particular 
(partly unknown) neural processes within a particular region of the 
brain is associated with this clinical success. Theoretically, however, 
such a pragmatic approach can be unsuccessful and potentially 
misleading. Clinically, reduction or elimination at the surface level 
of the post-traumatic symptoms is the crucial issue. Theoretically, 
however, it is of essential importance to establish not only whether 
a general level of functional recovery is seen, but also whether the 
mechanisms of such a recovery include re-establishment of the 
exact information processing lost to trauma. If the issue of such a 
re-establishment is not addressed, a more superficial examination 
of the post-traumatic rehabilitation of patients can potentially yield 
a false impression that lost information processing is reacquired.
In quite a number of cases, e.g., visuospatial neglect, the inci-
dence of severe symptoms is dramatically high in the acute phase, 
yet most seem to recover (Corbetta et al., 2005). Perhaps less dra-
matically, this picture is found in many different dysfunctions 
where the pattern of a reduction of symptoms when moving from 
the acute to the postacute phase is very different in the acute and 
postacute phase. In the acute phase, patients suffering neglect may 
show the well-known symptoms of not eating food on the left side 
of their plate, bumping into objects to the left of them, etc. However, 
postacutely, patients who recover seem to represent space in the 
same way as healthy subjects, and no experiment till date has shown 
that recovered patients have any abnormalities in this respect. In 
such cases, prima facie, it seems rather safe to say that cognitive 
functions are realizable in different neural substrates at the level of 
“cognitive domains.” So, at this most general level, there seems to 
be a 1:X relationship between cognitive states and brain states. On 
this background, it would seem plausible to also suggest that this 
is true at least at the task- and domain-specific level as well. Some 
studies, however, can be seen as challenging to this view.
Crosson et al. (2007) developed a method in which aphasic 
patients were trained in a naming task in a somewhat complex setup 
designed to achieve activation of right hemisphere mechanisms. 
Described in a simplified manner, the patients were required to per-
form a complex task using their left (right hemisphere- associated) 
hand as the initial step of the naming task. Theoretically, this vol-
untary activity can achieve a right hemisphere activation, which 
might facilitate other – more specifically language-associated – 
 activations within that side of the brain. Although not globally 
effective, the method appeared to produce a significant level of 
 success in many aphasic patients (Crosson et al., 2007). In a sub-
sequent study Crosson et al. (2009) investigated – by the use of 
fMRI – the neural activation patterns associated with the improved 
performance of the naming task under such circumstances. The 
absence of an impairment is typically established without refer-
ence to specific test procedures, but rather by a more direct (e.g., 
“general clinical”) observation of the individual. For instance, it 
may be immediately evident that an aphasic patient is unable or 
severely impaired when attempting to communicate via language. 
This can be established without reference to particular tests while 
more detailed observation and testing is necessary to perform a 
further characterization of the affected subdomains within lan-
guage, perception, or other post-traumatically affected domain. 
Similar arguments can be made regarding the demonstrations of 
recovery at this level.
With regards to task- and domain-specific functions, the situ-
ation becomes more complex. First of all, some may question the 
conceptual division between this level and the level of cognitive 
domains, arguing that this is nothing but a more elaborate descrip-
tion of the different domains. However, as a patient after brain 
injury may have very specific dysfunctions, lacking, e.g., the ability 
to recognize faces but have no other perceptual and/or memory 
problems, we believe the two levels can be separated at least as 
different levels of description or analysis. Generally speaking, it is 
conceptually and scientifically useful and important to keep the two 
levels distinct. For instance, two different visual tasks can only be 
conceived of as “visual” because they can be described at a “cogni-
tive domain” level as well as a more specific task-level.
Basic functions are prima facie very different than the task-/
domain-specific functions, as they should be conceived of as dis-
cretely operating systems without any direct manifestation at an 
experiential or a behavioral level. We consider these basic functions 
of the present model to be either identical to or at least at the same 
level as the Elementary Functions defined within the reorganization 
of elementary functions (REF) model (Mogensen and Malá, 2009; 
Mogensen, 2011a,c). Such Elementary Functions are basic informa-
tion processing units (to be viewed as a kind of programming mod-
ules for a modular programming system of cognition). Elementary 
Functions are not specific to any domain or task, since an indi-
vidual Elementary Function contributes to multiple higher order 
programs – each of which has a more task- and domain- specific 
application. The characterization of an Elementary Function may 
be more easily achieved in the language of mathematics than in 
the terminology of psychology.
The three levels of the presently proposed model are not to be 
seen as hierarchical in the sense that one is reducible to the other. 
However, the model suggests a conceptual hierarchy in the sense 
that for instance task-specific functions are categorized based on 
the cognitive domain (e.g., visual or auditory perception, logical 
reasoning etc). One may reasonably question whether the “granu-
larity” of the neural processes involved should not be considered as 
well. For instance, one might question whether reorganization after 
brain injury will not lead to a structuring of the postlesional areas 
that is similar to the prelesional ones in such a way that the concep-
tion of multiple realization this way will be challenged. However, 
considering such examples of recovering language abilities after 
massive injuries to the left hemisphere, such a worry seems to lean 
on a rather “coarse grained” notion of the involved brain processes. 
In other words, we argue that such a worry may be applicable to 
some cases but is less relevant to a more general discussion of the 
possibility of multiple realization per se.
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two arms) are the goals toward which responses are to be made and 
the animal is removed from the apparatus between trials. In the 
operant chamber, choices are made between two spatially separate 
retractable levers situated in one wall of the chamber and the levers 
are retracted from the chamber between trials. While the animals 
demonstrated an impairment when tested in the T-maze, the test 
procedure administered in the operant chamber did not reveal any 
lesion-associated impairment – in spite of the fact that the operant 
chamber-based procedures imposed the same demands as the pro-
cedures in the T-maze regarding what are believed to be the crucial 
cognitive parameters such as intertrial delays and the necessity to 
constantly alternate between spatially dissimilar positions.
These two examples show that although neural mechanisms 
spared by the lesion in question (lesions of the corpus callosum or 
the prefrontal region of the neostriatum) are able to successfully 
mediate certain variants of a particular task, the neural mechanisms 
within those spared parts of the brain are (at least initially) unable 
to allow a successful task performance under circumstances which 
according to the formal task requirements are the same but are 
realized in another test-environment – thereby calling for at least 
partly different cognitive and neural mechanisms.
The third and final example from animal model-based studies 
addresses more specifically the mechanisms of a post-traumatic 
recovery process. Rats subjected to bilateral removal of the prefron-
tal cortex, bilateral hippocampal lesions in the form of transections 
of the fimbria–fornix or a combination of these two lesions were 
studied in a water maze-based allocentric place learning task of the 
mapping type by Mogensen et al. (2004). All three brain injured 
groups demonstrated an impaired task acquisition. While the group 
subjected to prefrontal lesions in isolation showed a relatively mild 
impairment, the groups subjected to hippocampal lesions in isola-
tion or the combined lesions of the hippocampus and the prefrontal 
cortex, respectively, were equally and severely impaired. All animals 
did, however, eventually recover to a fully normal proficiency of task 
performance. Neither the speed of recovery nor the parameters of 
task performance revealed any difference between the two groups 
subjected to hippocampal lesions – begging the conclusion that 
if the hippocampus has been injured, the presence or absence of 
prefrontal mechanisms makes no difference to the mediation of 
task performance. Such a conclusion did, however, turn out to be 
a fallacy. Upon completion of the recovery training, all groups of 
animals were subjected to a series of “challenges” which aimed at 
demonstrating potential differences in: (1) the neural substrates 
mediating the successful task performance in the recovered ani-
mals, and (2) the cognitive strategies employed by various groups. 
These challenges demonstrated that when the hippocampus had 
been injured in isolation, the mediation of the successful recovery 
of the task received significant contributions from the prefrontal 
cortex. Obviously, such contributions were absent in the group 
subjected to lesions of both the hippocampus and the prefrontal 
cortex, and in these animals the most likely substrate of the suc-
cessful post-traumatic functional recovery was the parietal associa-
tion cortex. Furthermore, the two hippocampally lesioned groups 
differed significantly regarding the cognitive strategies employed 
(although these strategies were equally successful). In the presence 
of the prefrontal cortex, hippocampally lesioned animals were able 
to demonstrate an apparently normal level of cognitive representa-
results showed that the naming activity per se (not the performance 
of the complex motor task) was associated with an increase in focal 
activation within parts of the right frontal lobe. Apparently, this 
activation was associated with the linguistic improvements – in 
one or another respect representing a rightward “shift” of language 
processing. It is beyond doubts that such achievements are clini-
cally significant and may constitute an important avenue in future 
developments of therapeutic interventions. What remains open to 
question, however, is the issue of exactly what is mediated by the 
frontal regions activated within the right hemisphere.
In most clinical studies, it is extremely hard or even impossible 
to step beyond the demonstration that a particular recovery process 
is accompanied by a particular focal activation. In animal models, 
however, there has been a certain level of success in achieving an 
analysis of whether or not a post-traumatic ability to mediate a 
given task performance is in reality the same as the normal media-
tion of that task. A couple of examples will serve to demonstrate 
that apparently similar task performances upon further scrutiny 
reveal themselves to be dissimilar.
Lepore et al. (1985) investigated in cats whether information 
relevant to the performance of a visual discrimination task can be 
transferred subcallosally (without the presence of the corpus cal-
losum) between the two hemispheres. The cats of the study were 
subjected to split-brain operations in which the corpus callosum 
was severed. Initially, the discrimination task was acquired exclu-
sively via one eye (thereby conveying the information to only one 
hemisphere – since the optic chiasm had been split). Subsequently, 
the ability to perform the visual discrimination task was tested 
via the other (untrained) eye – thereby testing the availability of 
 discrimination-associated information to the untrained hemi-
sphere. This test of subcallosal transfer of visual discrimination–
relevant information was performed in two separate experimental 
setups: a classic two-choice discrimination box (a maze-type setup) 
in which food was offered as a reinforcement and a jumping-stand 
in which the motivation for successful task performance is the 
avoidance of an unpleasant fall. While the cats were able to dem-
onstrate a subcallosal transfer of information in the jumping-stand, 
no such postlesional ability was demonstrated in the two-choice 
discrimination box.
In another experiment studying rats with lesions within the 
prefrontal system, it was also found that animals subjected to a focal 
lesion were in one experimental setup fully able to perform a task 
normally associated with the injured structure. But when tested in 
another version of the same task the animals were clearly impaired 
(Mogensen et al., 1987). Normally, across species an impaired 
performance of spatial delayed alternation tasks is considered a 
key symptom of injury within the prefrontal cortex or associated 
structures such as the prefrontal part of the neostriatum (e.g., 
Mogensen, 2003, 2011b; Mogensen et al., 2007, 2008). Mogensen 
et al. (1987) tested rats subjected to lesions of the prefrontal part 
of the neostriatum (in which even the prefrontal cortex was likely 
to have been rendered inoperational since the lesion of the neos-
triatum also destroyed fibers, which are essential to the normal 
functioning of the prefrontal cortex) in two variants of spatial 
delayed alternation tasks. One of these tasks was administered in 
a T-maze while the other was performed in an operant chamber. 
In the T-maze, two spatially separate positions (in the form of the 
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of a specific conscious experience are identical based on behavio-
ral measures. Instead, we are fully dependent on introspection and 
the introspecting subjects’ reports (Naccache, 2006; Overgaard and 
Overgaard, 2010). Whereas several recent papers have argued that the 
use of introspection per se is not in conflict with the wish to do “proper 
science” (Piccinini, 2003; Overgaard, 2006), contrary to the leading 
notion not many decades ago, a specific problem arises in this context.
Even though it is not within the scope of this paper to fully 
analyze this problem, it is far from trivial how a person may intro-
spectively compare two “instances” of an experiential state. If you 
are shown two blue colors in sequence, one lighter than the other, 
you would probably be able to compare the memories of the two 
perceptions and conclude that they were not identical. However, 
let us say you were to report whether you experience the exact 
same stimulus of a blue color in the exact same way as you did, 
say, a year ago, or before a brain injury that for a period changed 
your experience of color, it would certainly be a much more dif-
ficult task. One reasonable hypothesis about the identification of 
an experience of, say, a certain color, is its relation to experiences of 
other colors. In another example, emotions, most people would be 
willing to say that the feeling of, say, joy has important similarities 
with the feeling of joy they experienced as children. Were it not so, 
this specific emotion would in fact not be recognized as a feeling 
of joy. Nevertheless, whether joy is experienced in the exact same 
way is difficult to answer for many methodological reasons – not 
just, although important, because of memory decay. The feeling 
of joy may have been recognized and identified as “joy” under dif-
ferent premises when one was a child compared to today, which in 
important ways may depend on changes in how often one enter-
tain this feeling, under which circumstances the feeling occurs, etc. 
Of course, the same argument could be pursued with many other 
examples (different types of emotions, memories, perceptions, etc.).
In recent years, there has been beginning progress in the 
attempt to develop more sophisticated methods to report sub-
jective experiences adequately (e.g., Hurlburt, 2009; Overgaard 
and Timmermans, 2010; Sandberg et al., 2010), yet the field is far 
from giving exact methodological solutions to problems as those 
sketched above. Nevertheless, we believe the field is sufficiently 
mature to separate different analytical levels of experience, which 
may help this difficult discussion underway. In Table 2 we provide 
a tentative framework for levels of analysis relevant to this issue.
A first, over-all distinction can be made following Rosenthal’s 
(1997) concept of “creature consciousness” – whether a person or 
organism is conscious in any sense. This distinction is of special 
tion of the position of the goal position (the platform in the water 
maze) while such a representation seemed to be absent in animals 
subjected to the combined lesion.
We would argue that all these three examples, in quite different 
ways, illustrate that cognitive functions are realizable in different 
neural substrates at the level of “cognitive domains.” However, 
they all serve to cast doubts on the conclusion that the “second 
level phenomena” (domain- and task-specific functions) are mul-
tiple realized as well. An easy counter-argument to the position 
that cognition is multiple realized at the most general level only, 
could be that no matter how many examples one may line up of 
the lack of such realization, one needs only one certain example 
of successful multiple realization in order to show that this is pos-
sible in principle. Against this, proponents of the position that 
multiple realization occurs exclusively at the level of “cognitive 
domains” could argue that in each case where we yet have not 
found limitations to multiple realizations of cognitive functions 
at the “second level,” the methods used have simply not been suf-
ficiently exhaustive.
In conclusion, we believe it is relatively safe to say that multiple 
realization occurs at the “cognitive domain” level. At the lowest level 
of our model, the level of “basic functions,” we believe it is too early 
to say anything specific as research on neuroplasticity is not yet at 
a sufficiently advanced stage. Currently, the discussion may focus 
on the “second level functions” where arguments may be formed 
for either position. If the position is correct that functions at this 
level are not subject to multiple realization, it would lead to the 
hypothesis that basic functions are not either.
LeveLs of anaLysIs In conscIousness
One may now reasonably question whether this approach is spe-
cific for neural substrates of cognition, or whether it is applicable 
to other aspects of mental phenomena, e.g., the study of NCC. As 
mentioned above, cognitive states are defined with regards to their 
functions, whereas consciousness is defined as subjective experi-
ence (Nagel, 1974). Many leading theories, trying to pinpoint an 
NCC, claim that certain brain areas are necessary for a person 
to be conscious of particular contents, e.g., Milner and Goodale 
(Milner and Goodale, 1995; Goodale, 2007) who argue that ventral 
projection streams from primary visual cortex are necessary for 
visual consciousness, and diverse, even more influential theories 
argue that the prefrontal cortex is necessary (Crick and Koch, 
1998; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001). Other theories seem more 
to focus on specific types of processes than specific brain areas 
(e.g., Tononi, 2004; Lamme, 2010).
Interestingly, in most cases, studies of NCC’s are rather explicitly 
following a definition introduced by Chalmers (2000) that an NCC 
should be the minimally neural representational system sufficient 
for representation of that content in consciousness. This definition 
is in itself open to multiple realization of consciousness, which 
leaves it as an empirical question only whether one should think 
of specific conscious experiences as related to brain processes in a 
1:1 or 1:X fashion.
Before proceeding, an important initial difference should  however 
be considered. As we consider consciousness to be identical to subjec-
tive experience, which at large is the typical position in NCC litera-
ture (Seth et al., 2008), we cannot determine whether two instances 
Table 2 | Levels of analysis in the relation between conscious and neural 
events. The number of levels and their labeling are tentative.
Level of analysis Description
“Creature level”  Whether a person or creature is 
consciousness conscious at any level or of any content
Phenomenal domain Modality or “category” of contents, e.g.,  
 visual or auditory perceptions, emotions, etc.
Phenomenal content The conscious experience itself with its contents
Character of content How the content is manifested – with 
 some degree of clarity, intensity, etc.
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Intra-modal plasticity related to consciousness is, also, rarely 
studied, yet some experiments give a few indications of such occur-
rences. For instance, Ramachandran and Hirstein (1998) studied 
phantom limb phenomena, where the experience of stroking a 
missing arm was associated with a factual stroking of the face even 
though tactile inputs from the arm and face map onto different, 
adjacent, cortical areas. The case is difficult to interpret as clearly 
showing plasticity in the neural substrate for phenomenal content, 
as this would demand an argument that phantom arm sensations 
are fully identical with sensations in a “normal” arm. Unfortunately, 
very few studies have investigated the “characters of content” empir-
ically (with few exceptions, e.g., Overgaard et al. (2008)), let alone 
the possibility for plasticity in their neural substrate.
These examples, though clearly not exhaustive, show that an 
empirical case could be made in favor of NCC plasticity – from 
a very general level to at least the level of phenomenal content. 
Counter-arguments could certainly take many different forms. One 
very general kind of counter-argument would say that in each of the 
here mentioned examples, the apparent loss of consciousness and 
its later recovery (in the Laureys case) or the changed correlation 
between a specific brain area and conscious experiences associated 
with it (in the other two cases), what has really changed is not the 
NCC per se, but rather other circumstances which are necessary 
for the NCC – yet not themselves parts hereof. Stopping the heart 
from beating would certainly make a person lose consciousness, 
yet this does not in itself show that the heart is a “correlate of 
consciousness.” According to the definition by Chalmers (2000), 
as earlier mentioned, we are looking for the minimally sufficient 
correlate, not a necessary correlate. Therefore, one could argue, 
these examples need to show that what has happened is in fact a 
change in the NCC.
Whereas this debate in the present context stands as unresolved, 
this, at least, gives us a framework in which this debate may take 
place and potentially be resolved by empirical means.
concLusIon
Taken together, we believe to have offered a general framework in 
which a qualified debate about the multiple realization of cognitive 
and conscious events can take place. As mentioned underway, we 
wish to underline that the number of levels as well as their exact 
character in the two “models” are highly tentative and may be sub-
ject to revision. Nevertheless, we believe they capture the essence 
of the kind of structure, we will propose.
With this structure, positions in the debate of multiple reali-
zations are no longer different ways to argue for or against the 
phenomenon as such, but opens up to more nuanced positions, 
arguing for plasticity at some levels and against plasticity at other.
We have deliberately said very little about the theoretical conse-
quences of these possible positions, yet this is certainly a question 
worth pursuing in future work. We do believe that advances in this 
debate could indicate empirical ways to answer otherwise theoreti-
cal questions about the mind–brain relation.
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relevance in the discussion of coma or vegetative state patients 
where it is still unclear whether we should conceive of them as 
fully unconscious (yet with some intact cognitive processes) or 
as conscious to some extent (Owen et al., 2006; Overgaard, 2009). 
For patients who have lost consciousness for a period and recover 
it later, one possible interpretation would be that consciousness is 
now realized in a different neural substrate. This would be a case 
of NCC plasticity at a most general level.
A further distinction, we believe, can be made between this over-
all level of analysis and another level – “phenomenal domains,” e.g., 
visual experiences, auditory experiences, emotions, thoughts, etc. 
“Domains,” in this case, refer to experiences for which the difference 
between them are not just the actual content of the experience, but 
the “modality” or “kind of presentation.”
As already now indicated, this level differs from the actual 
content, which may or may not include simultaneous differences 
between modality. In other words, at this level, a difference between, 
say, the visual experience of two different colors differ just like a 
visual and auditory experience do.
Finally, each content may itself be different from other instances 
of the same content. For instance, a conscious perceptual content 
may be present in different degrees of clarity or intensity. It is a 
theoretical debate worth having, but not possible in this context, 
whether two “identical” contents with different intensities as a mat-
ter of principle form two different contents, or whether one and 
the same content may vary in different aspects. In this context, we 
assume the latter position.
It is even more complex in this area of investigation – compared 
to the discussions above – to find experiments that can be said to 
reasonably argue for or against plasticity limited to one level.
With regards to the “creature level,” some experiments give 
reason to believe that the NCC may change after recovery from 
coma. In a PET study of a single subject, global metabolic func-
tion decreased substantially in the vegetative state following CO 
intoxication – as would be expected. However, after full recovery, 
the metabolic level stayed low globally (Laureys, 2005). Although 
some prefrontal areas did increase metabolism, it seems safe to 
say that whatever areas or processes may be involved in the NCC, 
they would be different in the pretraumatic and the post-recovery 
situation.
In one study, Ptito et al. (2008) applied transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) to early blind subjects and blindfolded controls. 
The blindfolded subjects reported experiencing phosphenes following 
occipital cortex stimulation, as expected from several previous studies 
(e.g., Amassian et al., 1998). Some of the blind subjects, nevertheless, 
reported tactile sensations in the fingers. The representation of those 
fingers appeared to be somatotopically organized within the visual 
cortex. Importantly, the number of cortical sites at which tactile sensa-
tions could be elicited in the blind was related to the number of hours 
of “Braille reading” per day. The tactile experiences do show that brain 
areas that normally would be associated with visual processing are now 
related to tactile experiences, which indicates cross-domain plasticity.
Cross-domain plasticity in case of individuals deprived of input 
within one modality is not restricted to “alien source” activations of 
the visual system of the blind. For instance, Lambertz et al. (2005) 
reported activation of the auditory cortex due to visual stimulation 
in deaf subjects.
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